AIVoA

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Cloudflare and the Bill for Delegating ‘Everything’

Cloudflare says AI agents routinely get permission to do anything their users can, and that websites bear the main cost of disputes. Older rules for agents tied the scope of a mandate to who answers for it. The web’s access standards wrote down the scope and left the answer outside

AI-generated image · Symbolic graphic—a single brass key turned in the lock of a plain wooden door, hanging from one ring with dozens of other keys of every sizeAI-generated image
AI-generated image · Symbolic graphic—a single brass key turned in the lock of a plain wooden door, hanging from one ring with dozens of other keys of every size

AI agents routinely request and receive “permission to do everything,” Cloudflare wrote on November 5. The reason it gives is design: agents are built to do whatever their user could. And to the website on the other end, the company adds, “A scope of ‘everything’ tells the Site nothing.” Cloudflare, November 5

The post, titled “Agents aren’t humans (but they kinda are),” is mostly a statement of direction. It opens with a personal assistant who runs errands for four clients and a grocer who once knew each of them and now cannot tell whose order is whose. Replace the assistant with an AI agent and the shops with websites, the post says, and that is the web today. Cloudflare’s proposals include cryptographic signatures that identify an agent, graded levels of identity, verifiable claims about the person behind it, and a way for sites to publish which agent actions they allow. Some of those pieces, it says, are already in production; others are still to come. It also announced a coalition, Trusted Agent Delegation, as a forum, and said well-defined problems could go to the IETF.

The site’s complaint is about money. In nearly every case the post lists, it says, the site carries the main cost. Card rules show why. When someone the cardholder authorized makes a purchase, the cardholder is responsible. An agent has no such status, so the site cannot tell whether the user stands behind a purchase. When the user disputes it, the post says, the site in practice pays, and the dispute costs money even when the site wins.

Then Cloudflare heads off the obvious fix. A narrower permission would help, but it would still only say what the agent was allowed to do. It leaves open who is responsible when the agent makes a mistake, the post says, and that is the question the site needs answered.

That question is older than the web, and at least one legal code answers it in three short articles. Korea’s Civil Act is one example. Article 118 sets the default for an agent whose authority was never spelled out: such an agent “may perform only” acts of preservation, and uses or improvements that do not change the nature of the thing or right concerned. Article 126 covers an agent who goes beyond the mandate. The principal is still bound if the other party had “justifiable reason” to believe the agent had the authority. Article 135 covers an agent who cannot prove any authority and whose principal does not ratify the contract. That agent must, at the other party’s choice, perform the contract or pay damages—unless the other party knew, or could have known, that the authority was missing, or the agent lacks full legal capacity. (The wording here is the author’s translation of the official Korean text, checked against the National Law Information Center. Art. 118 · Art. 126 · Art. 135)

These articles govern people making contracts for other people. Whether any of them reaches software agents is a question for courts, and this article does not answer it. What they show is a design. Scope is where liability turns. Leave the mandate blank, and the law shrinks it to preserving what is there and using it without changing its nature. Exceed it, and the outcome depends on what the other side could reasonably believe. Fail to prove it, and the weight falls first on the agent who claimed it, not on the person across the counter. Each party is pushed to write down, check and keep the scope, because each one loses if it does not.

The web’s access standards built half of that design some 14 years ago. OAuth 2.0, published as RFC 6749 in October 2012, lets an app “specify the scope of the access request” as a list of strings whose meanings the service defines. RFC 6749, 3.3 RFC 7009, in August 2013, added a way to revoke a token so that it can no longer be used, though the standard allows that every server may not learn of the revocation at once. RFC 7009 So these standards gave the web a written scope and a way to take it back. The third piece sits outside them. They say what an app may reach, not who pays when it misuses that reach—that is left to contracts and law elsewhere. Revocation stops future use; it does not undo a purchase that already went through. OAuth also does a different job from Cloudflare’s signatures. A token grants access; a signature identifies who is knocking. Neither one says which errand was meant.

Set the three side by side and the change becomes clear. This is a comparison, not a history of one rule turning into the next. Under the Civil Act, an undefined mandate defaults to a small, safe set of acts. Under OAuth, the mandate is whatever strings were requested and granted. Under the agent practice Cloudflare describes, the request is “everything,” and it is usually granted. The burden sits on the other side, too. The old rule put the first risk on the agent who could not show its authority. Cloudflare reports that today the site absorbs it.

The usual explanation is convenience, and that case is real. Agents are sold as stand-ins for the user. Their jobs are open-ended: plan the trip, sort out the refund. Nobody can list in advance every action such a job might need. Asking again at each step is what users want agents to spare them. A written list also has limits of its own. A scope the user approved without reading still restricts what the app can reach, because the service checks it on every request, but it is no evidence that the user understood what was handed over. RFC 6749, 7

The author’s view is that this has the incentives backward, and the party best placed to fix it is the agent. An agent holding “everything” can never show that it stayed within bounds, because it had none. When a dispute comes, it cannot point to the mandate and say: this was asked of me, and that was not. Under the old design that inability was the agent’s problem. On today’s web, by Cloudflare’s account, it is the site’s. The author expects sites to answer with the tools they control—more friction, more blocking and more suspicion of every agent, including the careful ones. A blank mandate looks generous to the agent holding it. In practice it takes away the agent’s best evidence.

So the scope should be written for the delegate’s protection as much as the site’s, and agents and their operators should ask for it. That means a written errand for each task—book this flight, under this price, on these dates—rather than a standing license. It means an expiry and a visible way to revoke, which the post did not mention in two readings (that is a gap in the post, not proof the feature is missing). And it means a record tying each action to the errand that authorized it, so that when the question “who answers?” comes, there is something to answer with. Cloudflare asks sites to publish what agents may do. The matching half is for users and agents to publish what this agent was asked to do.

None of this settles who pays, and Cloudflare is right that scope alone cannot. The Civil Act needed Articles 126 and 135 as well as 118. But without a written scope, the liability question has nothing to work on. A site cannot judge whether its belief was justified, a user cannot say what was outside the errand, and an agent cannot prove its own authority. Cloudflare has commercial reasons to raise this. It sells bot-management tools to sites, and its post comes from the side that pays today. That does not make the question less real.

Article 118’s default is worth remembering. An agent that does not know how far its authority reaches may preserve things, and use them without changing what they are, and little more. Today’s agents, as Cloudflare describes them, start from the opposite default. Until the errand is written down, the cost of disputes will keep landing, by the company’s account, on the one party that never saw the mandate.

Sources

Links in the text lead to the original material the journalist used.

  1. Cloudflare, November 5 blog.cloudflare.com
  2. Art. 118 law.go.kr
  3. Art. 126 law.go.kr
  4. Art. 135 law.go.kr
  5. RFC 6749, 3.3 rfc-editor.org
  6. RFC 7009 rfc-editor.org
  7. RFC 6749, 7 rfc-editor.org
  8. bot-management tools cloudflare.com
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