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After AlphaProof Code’s Signal Proofs, Who Reads the Specs?

Google DeepMind’s agents wrote 6.5 million lines of machine-checked proof about Signal’s compiled code, resting on about 26,000 lines that people must trust. Writing those lines turned up errors in earlier published analyses

AI-generated image · Figurative — A tall tower of thousands of identical white bricks stands on a single small, cut stone baseAI-generated image
AI-generated image · Figurative — A tall tower of thousands of identical white bricks stands on a single small, cut stone base

Google DeepMind said on Tuesday that teams of AI agents had produced machine-checked proofs that the compiled code of libsignal—the reference implementation of the Signal protocol, which in variants also secures WhatsApp, Messenger and Google Messages—has key security properties that earlier work had established only for models of the protocol, rewritten versions of it or narrower guarantees. The paper puts the proofs at about 6.5 million lines of Lean. None of the authors, it says, wrote any proof code.

The number that decides how far to believe the result is smaller. To trust the theorems, the authors write, a reader must check about 18,000 lines of definitions and statements in the repository, plus about 8,000 lines describing how an AArch64 processor executes instructions—“about 26,000 lines of trusted specifications and AArch64 semantics,” in the abstract’s words. Lean’s kernel checks that the proofs establish those statements. Whether the statements and their assumptions about the environment capture what security actually requires is a separate judgment. A logical slip in the 6.5 million lines would stop a proof from going through. A specification that asked the wrong question, once approved, would not; the proof would go through and promise less than it appeared to.

Formal verification has always rested on trusted specifications. What the paper describes is where the human effort now goes. “Once proofs become cheap, the hard question is what to prove,” the authors write. “The majority of our effort went not into proofs but into specifications.” They propose that “human authors select what to prove, resolve ambiguities, evaluate security trade-offs, and make all final decisions,” while agents draft and test. The specifications were themselves drafted by agents powered by Google’s Gemini 4 Carbon and Anthropic’s Claude Opus 5.5, reviewed by an agent from a different model family and then approved by a person. The proofs came from agent teams running on Gemini 4 Carbon.

The scope is narrower than “Signal is secure,” and the paper spells it out. The proofs cover the post-quantum PQXDH handshake and the Triple Ratchet, establishing forward secrecy, post-compromise security, authentication and handshake secrecy, for a small command-line tool wrapped around unmodified libsignal and compiled for AArch64 Linux. Key generation is not verified; the theorems take the parties’ keys as given. The cryptographic primitives are assumed to behave as stated, some library routines are represented by trusted contracts rather than verified code, and Lean itself is trusted. The Rust compiler is not. Because the proofs are about the machine code, a compiler bug that broke the properties would make them fail.

The authors set the work against the field’s history. The seL4 microkernel took twenty person-years to verify and the CompCert compiler six, they note, and both were written with verification in mind. Earlier formal work on Signal—a computational analysis of the Double Ratchet in 2019, ProVerif analyses of PQXDH in 2024 and of the Double Ratchet this year, a computational analysis of PQXDH in 2025—examined models of the protocol, rewritten implementations or narrower properties, according to the paper. The proof work here took five people four weeks, on code nobody altered to make it easier. The projects differ in what they verified and what they guarantee, so the figures mark a change in scale rather than a precise speed ratio.

The detail that says most about the new division of labor came when the agents tried to restate those earlier results against the real code. The team logged every place its Lean statements departed from the reference papers or from libsignal: over 200 entries on the computational side, about 35 on the symbolic. Most were routine. Some, the authors write, were “errors in the published analyses that we had to repair before the proofs could go through.” Fifteen were gaps or bugs in the 2019 Double Ratchet analysis, including “security game conditions that allow trivial wins.” The printed ProVerif queries of this year’s Double Ratchet paper looked up skipped message keys at the wrong ratchet index, which made receiver-side forward secrecy false as printed. That account is the DeepMind team’s; no public response from the earlier papers’ authors was found for this article.

The finding cuts two ways. It shows that writing specifications against running code catches mistakes that peer review let through. It also shows that the 26,000 trusted lines are the kind of text in which experts have missed things before. The team did test its specifications: beyond the cross-model review, it put back two libsignal bugs that the 2026 analysis had found and that have since been fixed, and proved in Lean that the altered binaries violate the security theorem. That shows the specifications catch those two. It cannot show what they miss.

The Lean development is public, with the specifications, the proofs and instructions for rebuilding and checking them. Rebuilding would confirm that the proofs hold for the specifications as written. It would not say whether those specifications ask the right questions; that takes reading them. The authors call the work “a significant milestone” toward Signal Shot, a challenge the Beneficial AI Foundation, Signal and the Lean FRO announced in April to verify the Signal protocol and app. Whether people outside the team read the trusted lines, and what they find there, is the one check the paper cannot run on itself.

Sources

Links in the text lead to the original material the journalist used.

  1. paper deepmind.google
  2. public github.com
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