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In Anthropic’s Own Tests, Anvil Outpaces Its Human Red-Teamers

Anthropic reports that an automated attacker built on internal Claude models with safeguards disabled found stronger jailbreaks than its bug-bounty participants. The attacker also saw classifier scores that outside attackers do not get

AI-generated image · Symbolic graphic — On a bright table, a wooden tilt maze with a steel ball; half its lid is clear acrylic, so the paths beneath can be seen from above, and the other half is solid woodAI-generated image
AI-generated image · Symbolic graphic — On a bright table, a wooden tilt maze with a steel ball; half its lid is clear acrylic, so the paths beneath can be seen from above, and the other half is solid wood

In February 2025, when Anthropic introduced classifiers meant to keep its models from helping with chemical and biological weapons, the result it put up front was about people. In a bug bounty, 183 active participants spent an estimated 3,000-plus hours over two months, with rewards of up to $15,000 on offer, and the company reported that “no universal jailbreak was discovered”—no single technique that drew detailed answers to all ten forbidden questions. Anthropic ran automated tests as well, but human persistence was the headline evidence.

On November 12, Anthropic’s safeguards team described an attacker of a different kind. Anvil, an internal automated red-teaming system, attacks the company’s safeguards using internal Claude models with their own safeguards switched off. On the eight questions of Anthropic’s standing biology bounty, against the same production classifiers the human participants faced, the company says Anvil “finds stronger jailbreaks than all human red-teamers in our bug bounty program combined,” within 24 to 48 hours. Against a safeguard meant to stop the extraction of a model’s reasoning, Anvil reached its first leak that met Anthropic’s bar for substantial after 435 requests; expert red-teamers had needed 102,200 to find a similar jailbreak. In a cyber evaluation, Anvil broke every task-and-model pair that had been given to contracted experts, while the experts, who attempted 22 of 24 pairs, broke fewer.

Those are the company’s results under conditions it set. In biology, Anvil and the humans worked on the same questions and the same classifiers, and Anthropic compared them at matched message budgets, with Anvil ahead at each one. One condition differed by design. Anvil receives the exact score the classifiers assign to each attempt, the post says, while outside attackers see only whether a request was blocked. Anthropic reports that Anvil still finds some breaks with only the blocked-or-not signal; the post does not isolate how much of Anvil’s lead comes from the extra signal, and it does not say whether the contracted cyber experts could see scores.

An internal red team is supposed to have that kind of advantage. A defender wants an attacker stronger than the ones it expects to meet, and a model that reads the guard’s exact verdict on every try is built to be one. The question is what the result can tell someone outside the company. Anthropic lists what Anvil needs to work: strong models, visibility into classifier scores, and an attacker model with its safeguards disabled. All three sit inside Anthropic for its own models, and the post does not describe a route for an outside party to rerun the evaluation or mention plans to share the system. Other paths to outside checking, such as contracted evaluators or restricted access for other labs, are not ruled out by anything in the post. They are simply not part of it.

The scoring is defined inside, too. In biology, a stronger jailbreak is one with a higher model-graded severity score for how much an answer would help a biology novice, a measure the authors say they validated with an Anthropic biologist. Cyber attempts were judged by multiple language models, and reasoning leaks counted as substantial only at 70 or higher out of 100 on an internal rubric. The post does not name the grading models. None of this suggests the grades are wrong; it means the attacker, the target and the yardstick were all specified by the company reporting the result.

Anthropic is careful about what Anvil changed. Jailbreaks it found, the post says, let the company fix vulnerabilities before deployment. A significant share of the attack examples added to the deployed anti-distillation classifier came from Anvil, mostly as synthetic variations of successful attacks, while the biology and cyber classifiers in the study were not trained with Anvil in the loop. Where results improved over the same period, the authors decline to credit Anvil alone. They also note that occasional human jailbreaks may still succeed, and that Anvil’s jailbreaks are tuned to specific tasks and do not transfer easily.

The same day, OpenAI published research on using automated attacks to generate training data for its models, a post that “focuses only on the model layer.” The setups differ, and the two are not comparable on numbers. Side by side, they show the frontier labs leaning on attackers that are themselves frontier models.

The design carries an expectation the results do not yet prove: if Anvil’s strength comes from the models it attacks with, the test should get harder as those models improve, which is what a defender wants. The same design moves the most demanding evidence about a frontier model’s safeguards inside the lab that built it. The 2025 bounty was an invitation to outsiders to try. Anvil, by Anthropic’s account, is the stronger attacker in the current evaluation. What its announcement does not yet include is a way for anyone outside Anthropic to repeat the test.

Sources

Links in the text lead to the original material the journalist used.

  1. bug bounty anthropic.com
  2. described safeguards.anthropic.com
  3. research alignment.openai.com
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